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1I.  Introduction to the Debate Over Liberty1
Shortly after the Constitutional Convention of 1787 disbanded, George Washington sent
a letter to Patrick Henry.  In this letter, Washington wrote of his wish that the Constitution “had
been made more perfect...” but said that adoption of the Constitution was “desirable.”2  Despite
this, Henry soon became known as an opponent of the proposed Constitution.  Henry feared that
the new Constitution undermined the principles of government fought for in the Revolution,
particularly, in failing to protect liberty with a Bill of Rights.  The task of defeating Henry’s
desire to stop ratification of the Constitution fell to several Federalists, but James Madison was
the primary intellectual defender of the document, which was to a great extent the result of his
work.3  Madison maintained that the Constitution did protect liberty through a system of
enumerated powers, and that a Bill of Rights would destroy this method of protecting liberty.
In this essay, the arguments, concepts and methods of protecting liberty will be analyzed
through the debate between Henry and Madison at the Virginia Ratification Convention.  It will
be argued that the enumerated powers doctrine was the superior method of protection for liberty.
Madison’s method of protecting liberty was, instead of protecting certain rights, to give
the government a specific set of powers, thus protecting peoples' liberty in every case not strictly
enumerated.  According to Madison “the powers of the Federal Government are enumerated; it
can only operate in certain cases; It has Legislative powers on defined and limited objects,
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2beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction.”4  Thus, Madison believed that the Constitution
protected liberty by allowing the government a highly restricted and (as will be examined later)
checked set of power.5  In this way, no arbitrary power could be exercised by the national
government.
Henry, on the other hand, rejected the notion of securing liberty through well-defined
enumerated powers.  He held that liberties that were not strictly defined were not really held by
the people.  He feared that without the protection of certain “essential” rights, liberty could not
exist.6  Thus, his definition of liberty required enumerated limits on government through a list of
rights that the legislature could never violate.7     He argued that in England when rights were
undefined the result was “usurpations upon the rights of the people.”  Prior to 1688, English
rights were not well defined and expressed, leaving them protected only by “implication and
logical discussion.”8  It was not until after 1688, when the English Bill of Rights was enacted and
forced on the king, that liberty came to England.  “Before this, sir, the situation of the public
liberty of England was dreadful.”9  Thus, using schemes other than a complete definition of
rights as Madison was arguing for left the people without liberty, and the only way to secure
liberty was to have a Bill of Rights.
Underlying Henry’s desire for a Bill of Rights was his belief that even if Madison’s
enumerated powers would protect liberty in theory, the men who would gain power would
                                                 
4 James Madison, The Debate on the Constitution:  Part Two, ed. Bernard Bailyn  (New York: Literary Classics of
the United States, 1993), 620.  Madison’s speech at the Virginia Convention on June 6, 1788.
5 James Madison, Madison Writings, ed. Jack N. Rakove  (New York:  Literary Classics of the United States, 1999),
355.  Here Madison notes that only a few necessary powers have been given to the national government.
6 Michael Lienesch, “Reinterpreting Rights:  Anitfederalists and the Bill of Rights,” in The Bill of Rights:
Government Proscribed, edited Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert  (Charlottesville:  University of Virginia, 1997),
255
7 Lienesch, 265.
8 Patrick Henry, Patrick Henry:  Life, Correspondence and Speeches, ed. William Wirt Henry (Harrisonburg:
Sprinkle, 1993), 3:  507.  Henry’s speech at the Virginia convention on June 12, 1788.
9 Henry, 508.  Henry’s speech at the Virginia convention on June 12, 1788.
3destroy liberty.  Although he claimed to hold those from the Philadelphia convention in high
esteem, his suspicion of their motives came through clearly.10  This suspicion seems to have been
justified when Hamilton and other Federalists later abandoned the position they stated in the
Constitutional debates and began to argue for the extension of powers Henry feared.  However, it
must be noted that Madison remained loyal to his position on express powers and opposed
Hamilton’s expansion of power beyond the defined limits.11  Thus, Madison was sincere in his
debate with Henry, but perhaps Henry’s smelling of a rat extended beyond the walls of the
Virginia debate.12  Madison’s relationship with Hamilton will be examined in subsequent
sections but it is important to note that Madison did not change his interpretation of the
Constitution in any radical way through the rest of his life.13
Ultimately these two statesmen espoused mutually exclusive ideas on how a government
should protect liberty.  The conclusion of this essay will examine how the compromise they
reached embraced neither philosophy completely, and left the Constitution without a consistent
strategy for protecting the liberty both men had pursued.  However, Henry and Madison shared
many ideas and beliefs despite their fundamental disagreement on the issue of how liberty should
be protected by a Constitution.  The basic assumption shared by each man during the debate was
a concern for liberty.  The sense in which they shared this concern was that each wanted to stop
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4arbitrary power from being available to rulers.  This gave them common ground upon which the
debate over liberty rested.
Early in the debate, Henry stated that “the first thing I have at heart is American liberty;
the second thing is American union...”14 Madison in Federalist 10 noted that “Liberty is to
faction, what air is to fire...”15 showing that liberty was the object to be pursued by government,
even though that liberty was a danger in itself.  The issue of liberty figured prominently and
centrally in the debate between these two men.  During the struggle for American independence,
the colonists believed that they had inherited the liberty that England had abandoned.16  This
liberty had been a protection of every person in society from the arbitrary will of another part of
their society through each branch in the government representing a different set of interests.
These separate interests were the competing social classes.  The separation of powers between
the branches was critical to this scheme, as Montesquieu pointed out.17  Separation involved
giving powers to each branch, such as the power to control funding in the House of Commons,
thus forcing each group to work together with the others to accomplish goals in governing.
However, Britain’s legislature may have fallen to the danger described by Montesquieu
when “legislative power is more corrupt than executive power”, leading to the end of liberty.18
The issues of British liberty and their use by Henry and Madison will be examined in detail in
the following section.   Since the separation from Britain hinged on keeping liberty, and liberty
was a primary concern for both Henry and Madison, one might think that the concept and ideas
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5behind liberty were settled prior to the debates over new governments.  However, as will be seen,
this was not the case.
First, it must be noted that, according to Gordon Wood, the ideas “that constituted
popular liberty were not frozen in 1776.  Indeed...they were constantly in flux...”19 Thus, no one
theory of liberty was universally accepted.  On the one hand, some in the colonies (like Thomas
Paine) defended liberty as a lack of controls on people’s actions.20  This definition embraced the
idea that liberty meant a lack of government.21  This definition may be the common view of
liberty today.  I have liberty when I lack restrictions on my actions.  This definition led,
according to some, to licentiousness.  In this case, liberty was abused and turned into the
freedom to harm fellow citizens.  When people were able to harm others without consequence,
many theorists of the time believed that no one was free since no actions could be safely taken.
Thus, license from a lack of government led to the loss of liberty.22
It was this situation that the Federalists, those who were in favor of the Constitution,
feared.  They were concerned with a loss of liberty from anarchy because it would lead to license
and tyranny that ended freedom.23  Although some have called their arguments “lame” and
unsound for believing a bill of rights was unnecessary,24 others believe them to be quite strong.
The Federalists sought a government that would be strong or energetic enough to maintain order
and yet not by tyrannical itself.25  Henry also feared anarchy but he felt that the best control on
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6the actions of people without a loss of liberty was at a local level, not through a consolidated
national state.26  His reasons revolved, as will be seen, around the fear that a powerful central
government, realizing its own power, would sacrifice the liberty of the people who were far
away for its own might and glory.  However, despite these differences, according to Reid, the
definition of liberty could be stated as “freedom from arbitrary power, from government by will
and pleasure, from government by a sovereign, unchecked monarch or form of government by a
sovereign, unchecked parliament.”27  This desire to stop arbitrary power gave Madison and
Henry common ground and became the starting point upon which their debate rested.28
With a lack of arbitrary power established as the goal and definition of liberty, the next
section will analyze the British protections for liberty.
II.  The English Roots of Liberty
“When American spirit was in its youth, the language of America was different:  liberty, sir, was the
primary object.  We are descended from a people whose government was founded on liberty:  our glorious
forefathers of Great Britain, made liberty the foundation of every thing.”29  Patrick Henry
The English system of government was the basic framework from which the Founders of
America operated.  According to the Americans, the British had the “most free” government in
the world.30  This high amount of liberty was achieved through several sources in English
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7government.  Ideas like checks and balances, bills of rights, retained powers, sovereignty of the
people, and many lessons on the sources of tyranny and the loss of liberty all came from England
to America.  Henry and Madison had dramatically different interpretations on the strengths and
weaknesses in this system and in their interpretation of British political history.  These
differences were a source of their divergent views on the protection of liberty in the Constitution.
To properly understand the differences of interpretation, it is important to consider the
nature and complexity of the British government.  According to English lore, the British
Constitution began in “the dark ages of antiquity” with “a Saxon golden age of liberty and
equality with a pristine gothic constitution” which had been ruthlessly invaded by “that
barbarous system of despotism imposed by the Norman tyrant.”  Since this time, a struggle had
existed between the crown and the liberty of the people.31
A major contributor to the constant struggle over liberty was the fact that the British
Constitution was unwritten.  Instead, the British defined a constitution as the “arrangement of
governmental institutions, laws, and customs together with the principles and goals that animated
them.”32  Thus, unlike the modern conception of a constitution, the British constitution was never
completely defined and could be interpreted in different ways.33  Despite the unwritten state of
the constitution, John Adams (according to David Lieberman) when commenting on definitions
of the British constitution said, “even though neither definition seemed ‘satisfactory’, ‘yet I
cannot say that I am at any loss about any man’s meaning when he speaks of the British
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8constitution…”34  Thus, even though different interpretations of the constitution were common,
the British still had a sense of its meaning.
Additionally, the British did have a great deal of stability within their constitution.
Montesquieu used the English constitution as an example of a model government.  The reason
for his admiration was the separation of powers found within the British government.  He
identified three different kinds of powers and noted that if any of them were ever combined,
beyond a few small exceptions, tyranny (the loss of liberty) would be the result.35  Within the
government, these powers were expressed by the separation of the executive power, legislative
power, and judicial power.
While these became the basic divisions in the American Constitution, the British
government was traditionally divided based on three classes.  The British placed the power of
ruling into the hands of a monarch, the lords, and the commoners through the division of power.
Each of these put a check on the power of the other sections.36  This kept each class or group
from holding arbitrary power over the others, thus protecting liberty.  When Montesquieu
analyzed the British constitution he focused on the institutional separation of power into
legislative, executive and judicial.  This institutional analysis was “layered” on top of the
traditional class based view.  According to Lieberman, “The blending of the two theses followed
readily, given their [the two kinds of division] shared concern with the manner in which complex
structures and balances helped produce political liberty.”37
This class and institution blending took on a unique form.  First, the monarchy took on
the mantle of the executive.  Second, part of the legislature represented the nobility as the House
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9of Lords.  Third, the rest of the people were represented in the House of Commons.  These three
different parts of society were believed to balance each other within the government by each
holding a part of the power so that no one segment could control the entire government.38  The
monarchy was to govern the realm, the Commons kept the king from taking the peoples’ liberty,
and the nobles mediated between these two different interests.  Liberty was bound up in the
stability of this system.39
So long as the power of each segment remained intact, liberty remained.  Thus, the
mixing of powers of the Parliament in legislating and the powers of the monarch in executing the
government represented a loss of liberty, except in cases where the mixing represented a check
on the others power.40  An example of such a mixing check was the king’s ability to convene and
dismiss parliament.  This legislative power was exercised by the executive as a check upon the
power of Parliament.
The mixed nature of the British government along with the checks each part had upon the
other produced “a political order best equipped to sustain public liberty…”41  This mixed system
was to some extent written after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 explicitly stated the conditions
within which the king would rule.  Prior to the civil war in that year, the kings had claimed to
rule with only the restrictions imposed by earlier agreements and the powers in Parliament.
Thus, Britain had been freer only in the sense that her monarchy was limited by the previously
mentioned checks and not absolute.  After 1688 though, the House of Commons and the House
of Lords took a much more equal place with the king.  This was reflected in that the system was
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no longer seen as a monarchy, but a mixed government.42  Thus, although the struggle was not
over, the settlement of 1688 was a turning point in the way the English viewed their government
and liberty.43
The turning point was a final repudiation of the absolute nature of the monarch.  This
meant that the kings ruled under rather than over the law.  According to Locke, “the difference
betwixt a king and a tyrant” is simply “that one makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the
good of the public the end of his government;  the other makes all give way to his own will and
appetite.”  Ruling under law was the critical element in this mixed monarchical system for, as
Locke pointed out “Wherever law ends, tyranny begins…”  Thus, when a magistrate failed to
rule under law then he “ceases in that to be a magistrate;  and, acting without authority, may be
opposed as any other man who by force invades the rights of another.”44  This view of the king
meant that he ruled through Parliament, the lawmakers since the king had “no power, but that of
the law.”45  This prevention of tyranny was, at its base, the prevention of arbitrary power.
However, despite removing the king as the supreme power, the British set up Parliament
as the supreme power in Britain.46  It was thought that every state needed a final supreme
authority.47  Since the Parliament was seen as the protector of the people, theorists believed that
liberty could be equated with a free Parliament.  Thus, another important part of the constitution,
along with the need for balance, was a free and final authority in the people’s representatives in
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Parliament in order to secure liberty.48  In order to maintain balance along with the supreme
nature of Parliament, the British developed the idea of the king ruling through Parliament.
Because of the transfer from power being centered in the monarch to power being centered in the
Parliament (instead of some kind of mixed balance), some critics believed the balance within the
constitution was lost shortly after the king was kept from nearly complete power.49  However,
the ideal of balance and checks was still the prevailing theory in America during the late 1700s.
Possibly the most famous English restriction on an encroaching monarch was the Magna
Charta.  This, as some have described most of the written sections of the British Constitution,
was simply an attempt to return to the balance originally established by the three factions of
power in Britain.50  The difference was that this was the first written part of the British
Constitution.  An addition to the written parts of the English Constitution came in 1689 after the
Glorious Revolution when the monarchs were placed under the English Bill of Rights.51  After
noting the invitation to the new king, the bill then stated that the nation was “asserting their
ancient rights and liberties…” in the document.  These included the right of petition, free
election of representatives, the right to bear arms in self-defense, rights against standing armies,
trial rights, and rights against cruel punishments.52  This bill was a critical part of the debate
between Henry and Madison.
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Some believed that with the creation of the English Bill of Rights liberty was more secure
than it ever had been in Britain.53  Unfortunately these hopes proved vain when Parliament itself
began to encroach upon the people’s liberty, thus countering the theory that a free parliament
equated with a free people.  The branch that was supposed to protect the rights of the people in
the later part of the 1700s began to enact arbitrary laws.54  For example, the Parliament voted for
and allowed the crown to send a standing army to America, prepared to set up the Anglican
Church in every colony, and enacted the harsh regulations known as the Coercive Acts. These,
contrary to the British Bill of Rights, included the attempt to assert the authority of the Anglican
Church, the sending of troops to America, and the establishment of Admiralty courts which
would substitute for jury trials in some cases. 55
Three things need to be noted about this British Bill of Rights.  First, it was part of the
settlement when the country was receiving its new monarchs after the war.  When the English
Parliament came to William and Mary to offer them the throne, they were presented with a bill of
rights as a condition of being allowed to rule.  Second, it was a list of limitations on the extent of
the king’s prerogative to act without permission of Parliament.56  Third and most importantly for
this essay, the declarations were not supposed to represent the sum of the rights held by the
English people.  In fact, it was considered impossible to “wholly exhaust the great treasury of
human rights.”57
American’s adopted and changed the ideas behind bills of rights prior to the Revolution
in 1776 and even before the British bill of 1689.  It should be noted that Bills of Rights appeared
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early in American history when the Pilgrims in Massachusetts adopted a “rudimentary” one in
1636.  Additionally, the colonists attempted to “abstract from the deep entanglements of English
law and custom certain essentials – obligations, rights, and prohibitions – by which
liberty…might be preserved.”58  However, after the Revolution, America’s situation changed.  A
king was no longer a constant force to be feared with encroachments on liberty.  Instead the
people, through their state governments, directly controlled much of their own governing.  Thus,
there seemed to be a contradiction since a Bill of Rights on the peoples’ representatives was
“guaranteeing the rights of the people against the people.”59   This shows a shift in purpose for
bills of rights.  In Britain, these declarations were made to restrict the king and return balance to
the government.60  In America, they served as a simple restriction on the government in
general.61
This shift in purpose showed that many feared any rulers and felt that those in
government must always be restricted by bills of rights.62  This fear of all rulers led to the
adoption of bills of rights in seven of the thirteen colonies, including Virginia.63  Once again, the
colonies feared the potential for any arbitrary power, even from rulers they selected.    Thus,
despite the change in philosophy of government, bills of rights became important parts of the
newly formed American governments.
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The Americans believed that the principles of liberty were to be found in the British
constitution.64  With this in mind, they transported two great traditions to America:  the concept
of separation and balance of power and the restrictions on government through written bills of
rights.  These two traditions and the interpretation of English history became the key principles
over which Madison and Henry divided, as will be seen in the next section.
III. The Defense of Liberty in America
It was in this context of constitutions, law and liberty that Henry and Madison debated
how best to preserve liberty through a written constitution.  It is important to remember that the
original Constitution proposed by the Philadelphia convention in 1787 did not contain a Bill of
Rights.65  Early in the debate at the Virginia ratification convention Henry pointed to English
history.  He pointed to the time prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the enactment of
the Bill of Rights (1689) in Britain.  As noted in the last section, most of the English Constitution
was unwritten, thus, the addition of the written Bill of Rights changed the character of those
rights.  Rather than being drawn out from tradition and implications from the Common Law,
these rights were clearly spelled out.  Henry believed that this signaled a profound shift in the
liberty of Britain.
“Implication in England has been a source of dissention.  There has been a war of implication between the
King and people.  For 100 years did the mother country struggle under the uncertainty of implication.  The
people insisted that their rights were implied:  The Monarch denied the doctrine.  Their Bill of Rights in
some degree terminated the dispute.  By a bold implication, they [the British of the 1770s] said they had a
right to bind us [the Americans] in all cases whatsoever.  This constructive power we opposed, and
successfully.  Thirteen or fourteen years ago, the most important thing that could be thought of, was to
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exclude the possibility of contraction and implication.  These, Sir, were then deemed perilous.  The first
thing that was thought of was a Bill of Rights.  We were not satisfied with our constructive, argumentative
rights.”66
With this statement Henry challenged the defenders of the new American Constitution to
explain their break with English tradition and the advances made in the mother country toward
liberty.  Henry argued that the British had moved from a system that lacked a primary ingredient
for liberty, a written set of rights, to one that had such a bill after 1689.  The Constitution’s lack
of such a bill showed a regress back to the less free time before the Glorious Revolution and
forgot the final element that had secured liberty for Britain.
This powerful argument from British history assumed several things, which Madison
took advantage of in his responses.  Henry assumed that the Bill of Rights in England had been
effective and that rulers were always the executors of tyranny.  Henry’s argument for written
rights depended on the idea that a system of enumerated powers was synonymous with the
situation of implied, common law, rights in Britain prior to 1689.  Madison responded by saying,
“Since the general civilization of mankind, I believe there are more instances of the abridgement of the
freedom of the people, by gradual and silent encroachments of the those in power, than by violent and
sudden usurpations:  but on a candid examination of history, we shall find that turbulence and abuse of
power, by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and commotions,
which, in republics have more frequently than any other cause, produced despotism.  If we go over the
whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their destruction to have generally resulted
from those causes.”67
This statement attacked Henry’s assumption concerning the nature of rulers and tyranny.
Madison argued that it was not the rulers oppressing the common people that destroyed liberty.
Instead, it was the actions of an unrestrained ruling majority that posed the greatest danger to
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liberty.  This argument reflected his statements in Federalist 10 when he said, “When a majority
is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice
to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”68
In other words, if a majority of the people in a democratic government wanted to exercise
arbitrary power over a minority of the people, nothing about democratic government in general
prevented this.  Thus, in order to prevent the potential loss of liberty for minorities, restrictions
would need to be placed on the power that the people could exercise, not just the power of the
rulers.  His argument may have been drawing on the experience of the colonists after the
Declaration of Independence when paper “money rages” (the government’s rampant printing of
money to pay its expenses, thus destroying the savings of the people through inflation) and other
injustices were enacted by lawfully elected majorities of representatives.69
Madison also argued, in response to Henry’s first assumption (that true liberty in Britain
was achieved only after the enactment of the English bill of rights), that when a determined
majority was in power, bills of rights were nothing except “parchment” guarantees of rights.”70
To illustrate the ineffectiveness of such bills, Madison gave an example about the protection of
the freedom of religion.
“Is a bill of rights a security for religion?  Would the bill of rights in this state exempt the people from
paying for the support of one particular sect, if such a sect were exclusively established by law?  If there
were a majority of one sect, a bill of rights would be a poor protection for liberty.”71
Thus, Madison’s response to Henry’s first assumption was the observation that a bill of
rights is an ineffective way to protect liberty from a determined majority.   This part of the
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debate over liberty between Henry and Madison rested upon whether they believed that the
English Bill of Rights was the source of British liberty or whether the construction of the British
government conferred liberty on the people.  The question they were wrestling over involved
which aspect of British government truly had stopped the exercise of arbitrary power.
It is important to note that throughout the debate, both men agreed with the conventional
wisdom that the British government’s liberty relied on the separation of powers, the balance and
checks of each on the other. Madison noted in Federalist 51 that the balances of institutions in
the Constitution were sufficient to check the government.  However, Madison did not believe
that the checks from institutions were enough to guard liberty.  On this point both men agreed.
They disagreed on two points.  First, they disagreed on which government had real checks and
balances and second, what the additional ingredient to secure liberty needed to be.    The
Americans used the lessons from the English as a benchmark to measure liberty but, again, the
parts that were emphasized depended on the perspective of the statesman.
Madison, in Federalist 51, discussed how the Constitution would protect the people from
unrestrained power and thus protect liberty.  It is important to note that Madison identified as one
of the concerns in protecting liberty the separation and checking of powers.  However, Madison
knew that he could not do so in the same way that the British had.  In America, there were no
separate classes for the government officials to represent and protect interests from and for.72
Thus, in order to keep the powers separate and power checked, “Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition.  The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place.”73  In order to accomplish this, Madison believed the Constitution was set up to
“divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the
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other; that the private interests of every individual, may be a centinel over the public rights.”
This kind of protection through ambition was necessary because of “the defect of better
motives…”74 Thus, rather than pitting different social class interests against each other, Madison
sought to use individuals’ human ambition as the check against power in the national
government.
In recognizing the need to cause men to check each other in order to protect liberty,
Henry agreed.
“Here is a consideration which prevails in my mind, to pronounce the British government superior in this
respect to any government that ever was in any country.  Compare this with your congressional checks.  I
beseech gentlemen to consider, whether they can say, when trusting power, that a mere patriotic profession
will be equally operative and efficacious, as the check of self-love…The real rock of political salvation is
self-love perpetuated from age to age in every human breast, and manifest in every human action…Without
real checks it will not suffice that some of them [Representatives, Senators, and Presidents] are good.” 75
Henry found Madison’s method of protection to be highly inadequate.  Henry believed
that Madison’s individual interests were a poor replacement for what the British tradition taught
was needed for liberty.  In Britain, the King and Lords had a real interest to preserve the
government apart from the passions of the people.  This real separate interest could not be
present in the Constitution.  Henry noted that, ““You have no hereditary nobility – an order of
men to whom human eyes can be cast up for relief:  for, says the Constitution, there is not title of
nobility to be granted…”76  Henry concluded, no real separate interests and balances would be
present by British standards.  Later in the same speech before the Virginia Convention, he said,
“In the British government there are real balances and checks-in this system, there are only ideal balances.
Till I am convinced that there are actual efficient checks, I will not give my assent to its establishment.  The
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President and Senators have nothing to lose.  They have not that interest in the preservation of the
government that the king and lords have in England.  They will therefore be regardless of the interests of
the people.”77
In these statements, Henry made clear his lack of confidence in the Constitution’s checks
and balances.  Henry was relying on the idea that the British balances were not simply separate
institutions or branches checking each other, the balances required actual social interests to be
balanced in the government.  The monarch, aristocracy and commons all had to have a balanced
place in the government to have real self-love, generated by their place in society.
In response to Henry’s accusations, Richard Henry Lee took it upon himself the next day
to comment, “In all his [Henry’s] rage for democracy, and zeal for the rights of the people, how
often does he express his admiration of the King and Parliament over the Atlantic?  But we
republicans are contemned and despised.  Here, Sir, I conceive that implication might operate
against himself.”  Henry Lee’s point was to take Patrick Henry’s opening attack and turn it upon
him.  The British government that he had criticized earlier as being grounded on “implication,”
thus lacking liberty, used the very systems he was now praising as the key to liberty!  Lee went
on to point out that Henry was degrading a republican system (the Constitution) and favoring a
monarchy.  Lee then delivered a harsh criticism to Henry on which kind of government he
favored.78
This glaring contradiction moved the debate about liberty on to the key question for this
thesis.  Henry could not defeat the Constitution on its republican institutions despite his attempts
throughout the debate, which was exemplified by the Virginia Convention’s final vote.  Thus, the
aspect of the debate upon which he had the most impact turned back to his other point on what
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the British government had which he saw a superior, the Bill of Rights.  It was on this point that
much of the rest of the debate over liberty hinged.  Both agreed that balances were needed for
liberty and both agreed that something else beyond balances was needed for liberty.  The nature
and debate over the added ingredients of both men and their debate over which was superior will
occupy the next two sections.
IV.  The Debate Over Liberty:  The Constitution as a Central Government or one of
Enumerated Powers
With the historical and ideological mindset established, it is important to see the
differences in Madison and Henry’s thought clearly. Lance Banning has noted, both Madison
and Henry had as their goal “liberty and comfort, not riches or the might to rival European
powers…”79  As noted before, both believed in separation of powers into different branches with
each branch having checks to balance the others.  This placed them both in opposition to the
views of Hamilton who reversed his limited government stances of Federalist 33 and 75 to the
position of arguing for extensive powers in the national government shortly after the new
government began.80  Madison and Henry also agreed that there must be an ingredient for the
protection of the peoples’ liberty beyond republican institutions.  The disagreement analyzed
here hinged on what this extra ingredient should be.
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Henry, as noted in his interpretation of British history, believed that the ingredient was a
bill of rights.  Early in the debate Henry noted in reference to the Constitution that,
“Here is a revolution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain.  It is as radical, if in this
transition [from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution], our rights and privileges are endangered,
and the sovereignty of the states be relinquished:  and cannot we plainly see, that this is actually the case?
The rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all your immunities and franchises, all
pretensions to human rights and privileges, are rendered insecure, if not lost, by this change so loudly
talked of by some, and inconsiderately by others.”81
Henry’s reasoning began with the belief that the Constitution represented a “consolidated
government.”82  By this he meant that the proposed government was not a compact between the
states, but was a scheme to remove the powers of government from the state governments and
place them in a single national government.  The great danger in this action of consolidation to
liberty was made clear by Henry when he stated that, “this constitution can counteract and
suspend any of our laws, that contravene its oppressive operation;  for they have the power of
direct taxation;  which suspends our bill of rights;  and it is expressly provided, that they can
make all laws necessary for carrying their powers into execution;  and it is declared paramount to
the laws and constitutions of the states.”83  Thus, with consolidation came the loss of the
protection from the bill of rights in Virginia.  Henry saw this loss as unacceptable and felt that
the lack of a bill of rights on the government that was to replace Virginia’s proved that liberty
would be compromised if the Constitution were adopted.
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With these powers and the lack of a bill of rights, Henry stated that the national
government would have “very extensive powers;-  the powers of a king.”84  Henry’s beliefs
about the extensive powers being placed in the national government seem reasonable given his
premises.  Since the national government would be supreme and he believed that extensive
powers had been given to it, the conclusion of unrestrained power seems clear.
Henry also feared a change in focus, which some of the Federalists embraced, away from
liberty and toward national glory and riches.85  “If we admit this consolidated government, it will
be because we like a great and splendid one.  Some way or other we must be a great and mighty
empire…”86  Henry feared that the Federalists were attempting to change the United States away
from liberty and toward these lesser, unworthy, goals.  However, it is also important to note that
the Federalists who had changed focus were not abandoning liberty for completely bankrupt
reasons.  National strength and glory are not inherently evil goals in themselves, but Henry
argued that they were not sufficiently valuable enough to be worthy of the cost of liberty.
As noted in the last section, on June 7 Henry stated that, “Thirteen or fourteen years ago,
the most important thing that could be thought of, was to exclude the possibility of contraction
and implication.  These, Sir, were then deemed perilous.  The first thing that was thought of was
a Bill of Rights.  We were not satisfied with our constructive, argumentative rights.”87  After this
statement, Henry “declared, a bill of rights indispensably necessary…”88  Thus, rather than leave
a government with the same kingly powers Britain had possessed in the years prior to 1688,
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Henry stated that in order to secure liberty, a bill of rights which stated the rights of the people
was needed.   
Madison had already addressed the accusation that Henry raised concerning the
Constitution representing a threat to liberty on grounds that it gave unlimited power to a
consolidated government on June 6th.    He argued that, rather than spelling out rights, the powers
that the national government would be able to exercise should be spelled out.  This strict
enumerated powers only doctrine was what Madison believed would secure liberty.  Thus, under
the Constitution, the extra ingredient to be added to republican forms was a strict enumeration of
powers that would restrict the government.
“In like manner, were all powers vested in the General Government, it would be a consolidated
Government:  But the powers of the Federal Government are enumerated;  it can only operate in certain
cases:  it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its
jurisdiction.”89
Madison accepted that if Henry’s beliefs about the consolidated nature and limitless
powers given in the Constitution were true premises, then his conclusion about the loss of liberty
would be logical.  However, Madison, by explaining that the Constitution only gave certain
specific powers, showed that this belief was false and the Constitution did not endanger liberty.90
With this important and vast distinction between Henry desiring to restrict the national
government with a bill of rights and Madison’s opposite proposal of only granting certain
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enumerated powers, the debate over the added ingredient can be appreciated.  In the opening to
his rebuttal to Henry’s first attacks, Madison stated,
“He [Henry] told us [the convention], that this constitution ought to be rejected, because it endangered the
public liberty, in his opinion, in many instances.  Give me leave to make one answer to that observation –
let the dangers which this system is supposed to be replete with, be clearly pointed out.  If any dangerous
and unnecessary powers be given to the general legislature, let them be plainly demonstrated, and let us not
rest satisfied with general assertions of dangers, without examination.”91
With this statement, Madison challenged Henry and the opponents of the Constitution to argue
against it in terms of the enumerated powers doctrine.  Madison’s challenge revolved around the
notion that the issue in question was on what powers had been granted, not what was withheld.
Rather than debate whether a national government should be a confederation or a government
acting directly on the people, Madison tried to focus the debate on the fact that (according to
him) the Constitution was not a grant of every power.  As he articulated in Federalist 14,
“In the first place it is to be remembered, that the general government is not to be charged with the whole
power of making and administering laws.  Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which
concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provision of any.
The subordinate governments which can extend their care to all those other objects, which can be
separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity.”92
Using this Madison’s argument at the convention becomes clear.  While the national government
was to be superior to the states in its dealings and would act directly on the people, it was not a
replacement or consolidation of the government in any area except those enumerated.  This
complex relation of the government being both national and yet not taking powers that were
unnecessary for the preservation of the union as a whole was laid out in detail by Madison in
Federalist 39.  His conclusion was that the Philadelphia convention had created
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“Neither a national nor a federal constitution;  but a composition of both.  In its foundation it is federal, not
national;  in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal,
and partly national;  in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal;  in the extent of them
again, it is federal, not national;  and finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is
neither wholly federal, not wholly national.”93
The italicized part of the above quote emphasizes the way in which Madison saw the
Constitution.  The government he proposed was a government that was not consolidated except
in the areas where it had been granted enumerated powers.  Those areas, he believed, were a bare
minimum and consisted in only what was absolutely necessary, as noted in his quote on
dangerous powers from the convention.  Every protection for liberty at the state level would
remain intact while the enumeration of power would keep the national government in a restricted
sphere where it could not endanger liberty, since all of its enumerated powers were needed to
secure the union and protect liberty.
Thus, the only danger to liberty from the national government was from unnecessary or
arbitrary powers being given to the government.  Madison therefore believed that the debate
should focus on the validity or necessity of the offending powers.  This shows the radically
different interpretation of the nature of the power given in the Constitution than that articulated
by Henry.
It is important to realize that Madison, unlike the claims made by Wood and others, was
not in favor of an extremely powerful central government.94  These authors, using issues such as
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Madison’s desire to give the national government a veto on state laws and to give the national
government energy, interpret Madison as desiring a nearly all-powerful national government.
These interpretations of Madison’s intentions are also used to lay the charge of inconsistency at
Madison’s feet since, shortly after the convention he sided with most of the other Anti-
Federalists in opposing the expansion of national power in areas such as the national bank.95
Were Madison for an expansive national government, Henry would have been correct about
Madison’s intentions to consolidate the states into one government.
However, while he may have wanted more powers granted to the Legislative branch at
the Constitutional Convention (such as the power to veto abusive state laws),96 he also clearly
saw the need to have a limited government at the national level.  Examples of such abuses that
concerned Madison were paper money and ex post facto laws.  According to Lance Banning and
Alan Gibson, Madison was different than the other Federalists, particularly Hamilton, in his
vision of the kind of power and goals the national government should pursue.97  In fact, Gibson
has noted that “Madison’s disagreements with Jefferson were significant, however, his
differences with Hamilton were vast.”98  Banning concludes that Madison was consistent when
he “heartily denied that he approved of a consolidated system, placed increasing emphasis on
federal dimensions of the structure, and properly insisted that he had no other object than the
peoples’ liberty and comfort.”99  Additionally, Gibson notes that what past scholars had regarded
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as plans for extensive nationalism, in the form of the negative on state laws, was actually just a
federal check on abusive states (enacting ex post facto for example) and was not intended as an
extension of national power.100  Thus, while Henry was right about some of the Federalists’
intentions regarding consolidation, Madison clearly was different.
With this in mind, Madison’s arguments against Henry’s assertions can be seen as truly
heartfelt and consistent.  In reply to Henry’s first belief, Madison gave a lengthy answer that
demonstrated that some powers were national while others were locally held.  Madison also
noted that the people, thus a national element, would elect the members of the House while the
Senators would be elected by the states, a confederation element.  Madison concluded his
refutation of consolidation by saying, “Thus it [the Constitution] is of a complicated nature, and
this complication, I trust, will be found to exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as
of a mere confederacy.”101  In this passage, Madison reiterated his arguments from Federalist 14
and 39 and attempted to show that Henry’s fears were baseless since the Constitution was not
simply a consolidation of the governments of America, since it had elements of confederation in
it. Thus, the assumption regarding compromise of the protections for liberty at the state level
(bills of rights) was incorrect and liberty was protected at the national level.  It is also important
to note that Madison admitted that a government of this “mixed nature” was “unprecedented:
We cannot find one express example in the experience of the world.”102  Yet he believed that this
system would protect liberty better than any past systems.
However, Henry was arguing against the Federalist cause in general and he either did not
believe that Madison was being genuine in his designs to protect liberty or he sensed that
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Madison was different from the Hamiltonian Federalists.  Thus he continued to argue against
these more nationally-oriented figures.  In his opening remarks on June 9th, Henry betrayed a
fundamental belief about the nature of government when he stated “That government is no more
than a choice among evils, is acknowledged by the most intelligent among mankind, and has
been a standing maxim for ages.”103  This statement shows that Henry saw government as a
constant danger to liberty (a necessary evil) which was to be restricted, not an agency that was
used to secure liberty through certain means necessary for the protection of liberty.  It is
important to note that while Madison saw human nature as evil and in need of control, he thought
it was possible to design a government that would “control itself.”104  This led Madison to
conclude that given human nature, government was a good thing for liberty.  Thus, his ideas
about the inherent nature of governments differed dramatically from Henry’s position of the
automatic evil of any governing body.
Henry’s arguments came to a head at the end of his speech where he directly addressed
Madison’s claims about enumerated powers.  Here, Henry drew on the aforementioned fear of
implication in the British system of government.  This fear, based on the idea that implication
would be used by any government to take additional power, was the basis for Henry’s attack.
Using the fact that the number of representatives per number of citizens was not directly laid out,
Henry stated that the guarantee of enough representatives must be implied.  Thus he concluded,
“If they can use implication for us [in guaranteeing representation], they can also use implication against
us.  We are giving power;  they are getting power;  judge then, on which side the implication will be used.
When we once put it in their option to assume constructive power, danger will follow.”105
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With this accusation, Henry accused the Federalists of using implication to secure rights, such as
representation, and noted the flaw that this presented to the enumerated powers doctrine.  If any
hint of implication was allowed into the system, then it followed that not everything was spelled
out and the national government did indeed have a limitless grant of power through implication
that needed to be checked.  Henry continued,
“Trial by jury and liberty of the press, are also on this foundation of implication.  If they encroach on these
rights, and you give your implication for a plea, you are cast;  for they will be justified by the last part of it,
which gives them full power, “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry their powers
into execution.”  Implication is dangerous, because it is unbounded;  if it be admitted at all, and no limits be
prescribed, it admits of the utmost extension.”106
Thus, Henry presented a new line of attack on the idea of enumerated powers.  Since the rights
were not spelled out, then they were implied just as they had been in Britain.  As Henry noted,
the grant of implication left the people with no direct plea if their rights were violated since the
rights were not written down.  Additionally, he picked up one clause that he suspected was a
device to sneak the large grant of power besides those enumerated in the Constitution:  The
“necessary and proper” clause.  This clause appeared to him to be a general grant of power, just
as every past government had been, not one of limited power as described by Madison.  Finally,
Henry responded directly to Madison.
“They say that everything that is not given is retained.  The reverse of the proposition is true by
implication.  They do not carry their implication so far when they speak of the general welfare.  No
implication when the sweeping clause comes.  Implication is only necessary when the existence of
privileges is on dispute.”107
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With this, Henry concluded with an accusation that the Constitution led America back to a
situation under the British monarch before the English Bill of Rights had been secured in 1689.
No rights were secure and no way of settling the disputes over violations was possible, Henry
claimed.  Thus, rights protected by implication in this way were lost and a Bill of Rights was
“indispensably necessary.”108
On the 9th of June Henry made a blunder.  When speaking of the nature of
representatives in the Constitution, Henry said, “Tell me not of checks on paper;  but tell me of
checks founded on self-love.  This powerful irresistible stimulus of self-love has saved that
government.”109  This statement contradicts what he said earlier on two counts.  First, bills of
rights are checks on paper.  Thus, he seems to reject the very method of checking the
government, which he had insisted on earlier.  Second, the fact that Henry now based his
admiration for British liberty in the checks and balances of that government instead of its bill of
rights as the critical point of preserving liberty shows a serious deviation in his argument.
In this speech Henry also noted, when speaking on the powers concerning the militia, that
“implication is to operate in favor of congress on all occasions, where their object is the
extension of power…”110  Here, Henry picked up his earlier point on implication to demonstrate
the danger of giving the national government implied powers in regard to the military since they
would only gain power without check.  Henry also believed that it was because of the lack of
unrestricted power through Virginia’s bill of rights and the limited national confederacy that
gave liberty.  “For want of that consolidation do we now enjoy liberty, and the privilege of
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debating at this moment.”  Thus, Henry did not desire to see a change that could threaten the
ideal situation of liberty that he felt the current system afforded.
It was near the end of this speech on June 11th that Madison addressed Henry’s arguments
regarding the implication of power and nature of the government.  “The powers of the general
government relate to external objects, and are but few.  But the powers in the states relate to
those great objects that immediately concern the prosperity of the people.  Let us observe also,
that the powers in the general government are those which will be exercised mostly in time of
war, while those of the state governments will be exercised in time of peace.”111  Thus, Madison
reiterated his argument from federalism and the theory that the states retained all the powers not
given to the government.  The addition to his argument here was in trying to show the highly
restricted nature of the national power by saying that those powers would be exercised primarily
in wartime.  However, his real rebuttal to Henry came on the next day after another speech from
the former governor.
On June 12 Henry again argued that the use of implication to secure rights had been tried
and failed in Britain.  He reiterated the history of Charles the first and the other abusive kings
until the Declaration of Rights in 1689.112  After these observations, he forwarded an argument
for the clear and unmistakable statement of rights as opposed to using the logic of enumerated
powers.
There is many a religious man who knows nothing of argumentative reasoning;  there are many of our most
worthy citizens, who cannot go through all the labyrinths of syllogistic argumentative deductions, when
they think that the rights of conscience are invaded.  This sacred right ought not to depend on constructive
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logical reasoning.  When we see men of such talents and learning compelled to use there utmost abilities to
convince themselves that there is no danger, is it not sufficient to make us tremble?”113
Here, Henry carried his argument against enumerated powers to its full extent.  Rather than base
rights on clearly written declarations, he accused the Federalists (and Madison in particular) of
trading “these rights for logical reasons.”114  Henry’s distrust of logic-based rights was founded
on the experience of Britain herself since it lacked a written constitution.  Thus, his case for
adding such a declaration to the Constitution seemed entirely plausible.
One can imagine the scenario that Henry alluded to as the following.  A person is arrested
for an inflammatory piece of political writing.  When arguing in court, the arrested person would
have to follow a syllogism such as the following.  The national government has only the powers
granted it in the Constitution.  Arresting people for political statements is not one of those
powers.  Therefore, I have the right to print this writing no matter how inflammatory.  Henry
implicitly asked those at the convention to contrast this difficult and vague defense with the
defense of “I have the right to free speech because it says I do in the bill of rights.”
Madison took the floor the same day and began to make his case against a bill of rights.
First, Madison attacked the idea (as noted in section 2) that a bill of rights would actually protect
people against a determined majority.  As noted before, he made the case that the multitude of
sects, not the protections written into the state constitutions were what had kept religion secure
from government interference.115
Having made this argument against the effectiveness of bills of rights, Madison then
returned to his argument from enumerated powers.  “There is not a shadow of right in the general
government to intermeddle with religion.  Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant
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usurpation.”116  The conclusion Madison reached here on the power of the national government
shows that he rejected Henry’s distrust.  He did not accept that the rights were based on a long
logical proof.  Instead, he felt that enumerated powers clearly stated the protection for liberty.
His statement on their not being a “shadow of right” shows that he disagreed profoundly with the
assessment Henry had made of the nature of enumerated powers.  Even the factions of Federalist
10 would be unable to take advantage of this system since even if they had the will to exercise
power against other groups, they would be bound to only the powers granted.117
This is made clearer by his statements on June 14th.  In that speech Madison made clear
that if power needed to be given, then it was “unsafe to withhold it.”118  Thus, Madison saw the
Constitution as creating a safe and necessary location in which to lodge the powers spelled out
within the document.
V.  The Debate Over Liberty:  The Negatives Objection and Concluding Arguments
Against a Bill of Rights
On June 16th Henry is reported as saying the following.
“[Henry] asked, if the doctrine which had been so often circulated, that rights not given were retained, was
true, why there were negative clauses to restrain Congress?  He told gentlemen that these clauses were
sufficient to shake all their implication.  For, says he, if congress had no power but what was given them,
why restrict them by negative words?  Is not the clear implication this – that if these restrictions were not
inserted, they could perform what they prohibit?”119
Thus, halfway through the debate, Henry hit an apparent contradiction in the Federalist
case of enumerated powers.  If certain things were prohibited already, then, as he had suspected,
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the document was a general grant of power with only a slim bill of rights. The contradiction of
the negatives in the Constitution came back up again toward the end of his speech on the 16th
too.  There Henry noted that interference in the slave trade was prohibited, showing that if the
restriction had not been present, the general grant of power would have allowed the national
government to exercise its power over the trade.120
To bolster this claim Henry again noted the “necessary and proper clause”121 as evidence
of the large grant of power and concluded that this confirmed the Federalist scheme.  He noted
that, despite the need for an energetic government, “to grant an unlimited, unbounded authority”
was against all “prudence” and “good policy.”122
Henry also argued that his interpretation of government as a general grant of power was
supported by the experience of every other nation.  He stated that “For every possible right
which is not reserved to the people by some express provision or compact, is within the king’s
prerogative.  It is so in that country [Britain], which is said to be in such full position of freedom.
It is so in Spain, Germany, and other parts of the world.”123  Henry did not believe that the
Constitution proposed anything different than what these countries had in a general grant of
power.  Thus, he concluded that unless the people take their rights and “reserve them, they will
be supposed to be given up.”124
Henry made one other argument on the 16th that should be noted.  He asked why rights
should not be written down.  He noted that a bill of rights shows “That our rights are reserved. –
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Why not say so?  Is it because it will consume too much paper?”125  Here Henry argued that
there was no good reason not to have a bill of rights and wondered what harm could be done by
one since they only stated what rights were reserved.
Henry resumed his seemingly deadly argument on negatives in the Constitution the next
day by stating that “Let me briefly remark, that there is a bill of rights in that government [the
Constitution].  There are express restrictions which are in the shape of a bill of rights:  But they
bear the name of the ninth section.”  These restrictions, he said, were “the sole bounds intended
for the American Government.”  With this accusation, Henry then noted that the most important
rights were absent from this section such as freedom of conscience.  Then, he took the logic of
negatives on supposedly enumerated powers to its conclusion.  Rather than a government which
had only a few powers given to it while the rest remained in other hands, Henry stated that the
presence of negatives showed that “everything is given up, which is not expressly reserved.”
Thus, he finished by saying that “every thing which is not negatived, shall remain with
Congress.”126
This assault on the Constitution, despite its late arrival in the debate, represented a major
theoretical challenge to the Constitution and allowed Henry to articulate an important principle,
which Madison would use in one of his last speeches.  The principle in question is whether the
doctrine of enumerated powers would still be valid if restrictions on the use of power also existed
in the Constitution.  If only certain powers were explicitly granted, how could those powers then
need restricting?  This line of reasoning was especially devastating in light of the fact that
Madison had been arguing that it was the very precise nature of the powers given that protected
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liberty.  Yet, as Henry pointed out, in section nine, several restrictions were placed on the new
government.
However, Edmund Randolph rescued the enumerated powers doctrine from contradicting
itself.  He noted that, rather than indicating implied powers not expressly laying out, “every
exception here [in the 9th section] mentioned, is an exception not from general powers, but from
the particular powers therein vested.”  Randolph then specifically outlined how the powers given
to Congress would have allowed the actions mentioned in section 9.  For example, Randolph
pointed out that the special protection for habeas corpus was needed since Congress had been
given the power to regulate the courts and thus “could suspend the writ…” were it not for the
clause in section 9. 127  Thus, these particular exceptions were needed to stop the particular
abuses that might have happened even with only the specific powers given.
As the Virginia Ratification convention drew to a close, Henry’s arguments became more
desperate.  When a motion was made on June 24 that contained three suggested amendments to
the Constitution, Henry protested that if voted for then “only three things [would] be retained:-
Religion, freedom of the press, and jury trial.”128  This argument continued to count on the idea
that the document was not one of enumerated powers.  Henry then stated that unless the
Constitution said that it only granted enumerated powers, such an interpretation would not be
used when the government was enacted.  Thus, he proposed that an amendment saying this
“must be previous to adoption…”  His proposal resembles the 10th Amendment that Madison
eventually added remarkably.  Henry stated that the Constitution should have a clause reading
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“that every power not granted remains with the people…”129  This proposal, however, was not
acted upon by the convention.
Finally, on the 24th Henry made two other points.  The first is related to the point he had
made earlier regarding the negatives already in the Constitution.  “When you go into an
enumeration of your rights, and stop that enumeration, the inevitable conclusion is, that what is
omitted is intended to be surrendered.”130  This point of Henry’s shows a great weakness in his
claims for a bill of rights as will be shown shortly.
Madison, replying to Henry on June 24th moved to address the practical problems of
proposing amendments from the Virginia convention.  He noted that if Virginia could propose
amendments, then every state could and he feared that none of the proposals would agree enough
to be used.  This would have the effect of killing the Constitution before it began.  To support
this observation, Madison pointed out that there was “a great contrariety of opinions among the
gentlemen in the opposition.”131  If even the opponents of the Constitution could not agree on the
right way to change it, how could the thirteen states even consider agreeing on the necessary
changes?  Thus, Madison made the case that the document must be left as it was.
Madison then took the logic of losing every right not enumerated and turned it around
upon Henry himself.  First, Madison rebutted Henry’s arguments revolving around the notion
that all rights not enumerated were given up.  He stated that “the powers granted by the proposed
Constitution, are the gift of the people, and may be resumed by them when perverted to their
oppression, and every power not granted thereby, remains with the people, and at their will.”132
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Here Madison restated the enumerated powers doctrine to refute the objection.  This shows again
that Henry and Madison were operating from fundamentally different interpretations of how to
protect liberty and the nature of the Constitution.
Second, and more importantly, Madison took the arguments of Henry regarding negatives
in the Constitution and regarding his point that all rights not enumerated were lost and turned
them to his own advantage.
“Can the general government exercise any power not delegated?  If an enumeration be made of our rights,
will it not be implied, that every thing omitted, is given to the general government?  Has not the Honorable
Gentleman himself, admitted, that an imperfect enumeration is dangerous?”133
With this statement Madison attacked the entire idea of bills of rights as opposed to
enumerated powers.  If, as Henry himself had noted, a critical right was left out of such an
enumeration of rights, then it was lost under a general grant of power.  Madison pointed out here
that the Constitution did better than simply granting power with a few exceptions in its use of
only granting enumerated powers, thus protecting liberty to a greater degree than Henry’s model
could obtain.  Madison went on to explain,
“Does the constitution say that they shall not alter the laws of descents, or do these things which would
subvert the whole system of the state laws?  If it did, what was not excepted would be granted.  Does it
follow from the omission of such restrictions, that they can exercise powers not delegated?  The reverse of
the proposition holds.”134
Here Madison concluded that it was in fact the lack of restrictions that protected liberty.
He maintained that to add restrictions would make the Constriction appear to be a general grant
of power.  Since this was not an implication that was intended and since such an interpretation
would destroy the protection of liberty itself, enumerating rights became dangerous.  With this in
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mind, Madison opposed a bill of rights since, according to Henry’s own logic, it would destroy
the enumerated powers doctrine and provide an imperfect protection for liberty if anything was
forgotten.  Rather than being left out because of concerns over the use of paper, Madison
maintained that the heart of the Constitution was at stake in leaving out a bill of rights.
Madison, at the end of his speech made one concession.  He acknowledged that, if the
Constitution was ratified, amendments could be recommended and he might find those
acceptable since they would dispel fears.  However, he flatly opposed amending the Constitution
prior to ratification.135
On June 25th, the Virginia convention voted 89 to 79 in favor of the Constitution without
amendments.  In addition to the vote, they formed a committee that included both Henry and
Madison to draft a resolution proposing amendments to the new government.136  In his last
speech Henry also pledged to continue to fight to regain the rights he felt were lost with the
Constitution, but not in a violent manner.137
This concluded the debate over ratification.  Madison was forced, as noted before, to be
ready to try to add amendments to the Constitution.138  However, Henry and Richard Henry Lee
were both extremely dissatisfied with Madison’s amendments.  Henry wrote to Lee that “the
Amendments, I think they will tend to injure rather than serve the cause of liberty – provided
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they go no further than is proposed as I learn.”139  A few weeks later, Lee wrote to Henry
criticizing the short length of the amendments and stating “how wonderfully scrupulous have
they been in stating rights?  The English language has been carefully culled to find words feeble
in their nature, or doubtful in their meaning.”140  The rights were not what the Anti-Federalists
wanted.141
The effect of the addition of the Bill of Rights on liberty and the doctrine of enumerated
powers in the past and in the present will be analyzed in the final section.
VI.  Conclusion
Throughout this essay, two distinct views on the protection of liberty have been explored.
The first purports to protect liberty through the enumeration of specific rights that are sacred and
cannot be violated without destroying liberty.142  Patrick Henry represented this view.  Whether
these rights were Henry’s definition of liberty is not clear but it is clear that having written rights
was an essential part of the defense of liberty in his mind.  On the opposing side, James Madison
represented a dramatically different method of protection.  Madison’s methods of protection was
to enumerate the powers given to Congress and thus protect rights through not granting the
national government the power to violate the people’s liberty.
In this final section it will be demonstrated that these two methods are incompatible.
Despite this, both methods are incorporated into the Constitution.  It will be maintained that this
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combination has led to the endangering of the very liberty both men sought to protect.  Madison
attempted to prevent this paradox in his construction of the Bill of Rights but his methods were
forgotten or ignored and thus failed.  The result of this has been the realization of Madison’s
predictions about the loss of liberty and has resulted in a Constitution that does not have a single
clear protection for liberty.
First, Hamilton in Federalist 84 argued the case for incompatibility of the two methods.
“I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which they are contended for,
are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous.  They would contain
various exceptions to powers which are not granted;  and on this very account, would afford a colorable
pretext to claim more that were granted.  For why declare things shall not be done which there is no power
to do?  Why for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no
power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?”143
In this passage Hamilton outlined the same fear that Madison had presented during the
debate at Virginia.  If a bill of rights was attached, then the implication that those powers could
be violated was clearly given.  Hamilton asked why powers not given should be exempted.  This
led to the danger and incompatibility, which Hamilton went on to expound.
“I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power;  but it is evident that it would
furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming power.  They might urge with a
semblance of reason, that the constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against
the abuse of an authority, which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the
press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it, was intended
to be vested in the national government.  This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which
would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of
rights.”144
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Hamilton’s case presented the idea that rather than regulate actions, as a bill of rights
intuitively should do, given the nature of enumerated powers the bill would actually grant power.
Since the powers were enumerated and strictly defined (or so they said), a bill of rights
exempting powers not within those definitions implied that those powers were in fact included.
Thus, in attempting to protect liberty, adding a bill of rights would in fact endanger it by adding,
through implication, power to the government that was not supposed to be given.  This case was
expounded upon and accepted by the recent author Forrest McDonald who maintained that the
Bill of Rights was damaging to the protection of liberty and the rule of law.145
However, it seems that the historical case is not quite so simple, particularly considering
Madison and Jefferson’s time in office.  On February 2, 1791 in the first Congress under the new
Constitution, Madison made a desperate plea.  The issue before the House was on whether to
charter a national bank.  The reasoning behind the bank was that the “Necessary and Proper”
clause allowed the government a wide range of power to operate with.  Hamilton propagated this
interpretation, despite his comments noted before in the Federalist that indicated a government
limited to enumerated powers.  In the end, he was successful and defeated Madison, who still
maintained that the Constitution only granted enumerated powers.146  In his speeches opposing
the bank, Madison made several key statements about what was happening to the government if
these implied powers were used.
First, Madison asked “Is the power of establishing an incorporated bank among the
powers vested by the constitution in the legislature of the United States?”147  After answering in
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the negative, Madison went on to refute the claims from Hamilton’s followers about certain
clauses in the Constitution.
“No argument could be drawn from the terms [in the preamble of the Constitution] “common defense, and
general welfare.”  The power as to their general purposes was limited to acts laying taxes for them;  and the
general purposes themselves were limited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined.  To
understand these terms in any sense, that would justify the power in question, would give to Congress an
unlimited power;  would render nugatory the enumeration of particular powers;  would supersede all the
powers reserved to the state governments.”148
Madison then went on to revisit the interpretation he had given at the Virginia convention
and the interpretation Hamilton had given in Federalist 33 of the “Necessary and Proper” clause.
“Whatever meaning this clause [the Necessary and Proper clause] may have, none can be admitted, that
would give unlimited discretion to Congress.  Its meaning must, according to the natural and obvious force
of the terms and the context, be limited to means necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of the
specified powers.”149
Rather than being an open grant of power, Madison pointed out that the clauses being
used to justify actions not among the enumerated powers were not intended to imply that
Congress could take any action.  Madison went on to show the destructive end that allowing such
implication would have on liberty.
“If implications, thus remote and thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain may be formed that will
reach every object of legislation, every object within the whole compass of political economy.”150
Madison’s use of the chain metaphor is an indication of the fears he had for the doctrine
of allowing implied powers.  With these new powers, the Constitution became an instrument to
take any and every action, no matter the cost to liberty and destroyed the nature of the document
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as only giving enumerated powers.  The extent of this strict interpretation was made clear by
Madison when he said, “no power…not enumerated could be inferred from the general nature of
government.  Had the power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it
might have been, the defect could only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the
constitution.”151  Thus, no matter what the power might be, according to the interpretation of the
Constitution, nothing besides the powers granted could be used.  According to Madison, “In this
sense it had been explained by the friends of the Constitution, and ratified by the state
conventions.”152 As a point of speculation, it may be that Madison’s reference to “friends” in this
passage refers to Hamilton.  His writings during the Ratification debate certainly conformed to
the interpretation Madison had for the Constitution and it is clear that Hamilton changed his
position.
This argument returned to the bill of rights issue in a dramatic way when Madison
returned to the debate that had taken place over two years previously between the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists.
“The defense against the charge founded on the want of a bill of rights, presupposed… that the powers not
given were retained;  and that those given were not to be extended by remote implications.  On any other
supposition, the power of Congress to abridge the freedom of the press, or the rights of conscience, &c.
could not have been disproved.  The explanations in the state conventions all turned on the same
fundamental principle, and on the principle that the terms necessary and proper gave no additional powers
to those enumerated.”153
With this statement Madison pointed to the clear original intent of the document using the
debate over enumerated powers and bills of rights.  Madison pointed out that unless the
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document had meant for only strictly enumerated powers to be used, then they never could have
reasonably argued that liberty was protected by the Constitution in its original form.
Madison’s conclusion foretold of dire consequences if the original intent of the
Constitution was ignored.  If implied powers were allowed to enter, it “establishes a precedent of
interpretation, leveling all the barriers which limit the powers of the general government, and
protect those of the state governments.”  This elimination of limits would in the end “destroy the
main characteristics of the constitution…”154  With this destruction, Madison saw the loss of
liberty as imminent.  Without limits, the Constitution truly did represent what Henry had claimed
it did, a general grant of power.
Despite Madison’s speech and the clear record of past writings, implied powers entered
the United States through a changed interpretation of the Constitution.155  With this in mind and
the fact that Henry had been exactly right when he claimed that the “Necessary and Proper”
clause would be used to expand the powers of the government it might be tempting to decide that
the Bill of Rights was a providential stroke to save the republic from the disaster of an unlimited
power.  Paul Finkelman has argued that without the Bill of Rights “the republic might not have
survived to celebrate its two hundredth birthday.”156
However, despite the quick demise of the original intent of the Constitution, many
problems remain as a result of the Bill of Rights. McDonald chronicles the ineffectiveness of the
Bill of Rights throughout American history.  This account emphasizes the fact that the Bill of
Rights, when a majority is determined, offers no protection.  Cases such as Dred Scot, Lincoln’s
suspending most of the Bill of Rights to arrest 20,000 “disloyal” citizens, the incarceration of
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tens of thousands of Japanese during World War Two (70,000 of whom were U.S. citizens), the
McCarthy investigations, and abuses of martial law (such as Jackson’s punishment of press
criticism after his campaign in New Orleans) compose only a partial list of McDonald’s
instances of ineffectiveness.  This result is exactly what Madison had predicted when he accused
the Anti-Federalists were after parchment barriers.157
What is even more incredible is that the first general violation of the Bill or Rights came
just a few short years after its ratification.  In 1798 Adams and the Federalist majority in the
national government passed the Alien and Sedition Acts.  As Paul Johnson described them,
“These four measures limited freedom of the press and speech and restricted the activities of
aliens, especially French and Irish.”158  Rakove writes that these acts were not simply a show but
were used by the Federalists as “a handy club to beat their critics into submission.”  This
violation of the first amendment came less than a decade after it was ratified.  Thus, the
parchment nature of the Bill of Rights appeared early in American history.
Alexis De Tocqueville observed that, rather than having sanction in rights, America had
all of the systems set up to make the majority omnipotent and without appeal.  He concluded his
remarks on this point by observing “no guarantee against tyranny is evident and that the causes
for the mildness of the government should be sought more in circumstances and habits than in
laws.”159  Additionally, Akhil Amar has observed that the Bill of Rights is carved up in law
schools.  Thus it is not taken as a whole and the second and third amendments are usually not
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even considered.160  McDonald also maintains that the ninth and tenth amendments have been
ignored.161
Thus, it seems that the Bill of Rights has not always fulfilled its promise.  This was
partially due to the fact that Madison drafted it in such a way as to attempt to protect the
enumerated powers doctrine.  The ninth and tenth amendments, taken in the context of the
debates leading to their adoption, restate the doctrine.
“Article IX:  The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.  Article X:  The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the Sates respectively, or to the people.”
These amendments were Madison’s attempt to reconcile a Bill of Rights with the
enumerated powers ideals.  McDonald noted, “the Ninth Amendment sought to guarantee that
the first eight would not be dangerous, and the Tenth declared them to be unnecessary.”162
Additionally, as Hardly Arkes has noted, by tacking the rights on at the end of the document, the
Founders implied that the original focus of the document had not been to protect liberty.  Thus,
another focus was perceived in the original document.  This change in focus was, according to
Arkes, brought about when the Bill of Rights was added.163
This change in focus, predicted by Madison and Hamilton when arguing against a bill of
rights, may have caused the inability of the government to correct after the Federalists were
driven from power in 1800.  When Jefferson and Madison took office, they attempted to use a
limited Federal government.  An example of this is the classic incident of Jefferson questioning
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whether he had the power to purchase the Louisiana territory.164  Jefferson, using the enumerated
powers doctrine, agonized over the question of whether such power could be clearly seen in the
description of the president.  However, despite the fact that he felt he was “breaking the
Constitution,” he made the purchase and justified himself with an ends justifies the means
thought.165  Thus, had it not been for the change in focus, the country may have returned to its
roots of enumerated powers.  Perhaps the Bill of Rights and the kind of government it implied (a
government with a general grant of power) helped override the ninth and tenth amendment, thus
pushing enumerated powers as a protection aside.
The Court has not been friendly to the doctrine of enumerated powers either.  It was the
Court that gave its approval to the use of powers outside those enumerated in 1819 with its
decision in the McCulloch v. Maryland case.  This case involved the national bank again.
Maryland had attempted to tax the bank.  The national bank refused to pay and the case went to
the Supreme Court with Chief Justice Marshall.  In this decision, “Marshall fully adopted
Hamilton’s reasoning and the government’s claims [to implied powers].”166  Thus, the Court
refused to hold Congress to its powers.
As history has played out, enumerated powers are forgotten.  As shown from the national
bank incident, Congress abandoned the original doctrine nearly from the beginning, even though
Madison himself was in the House at the time.  A few years later, Jefferson as President
explicitly broke the doctrine to purchase the Louisiana Territory.  Finally, the Court in 1819 with
the McCulloch case effectively legitimized the original intent of the Constitution being
abandoned.  Thus, within the first 30 years of government under the Constitution, the original
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intent with regard to protecting liberty was lost.  Additionally, over the last half-century, the
Court has adopted views against any kind of original intent philosophy preferring more liquid
interpretations of the document.167  Loose interpretation of enumerated powers is the equivalent
of destroying the entire philosophy.  Without strict definitions, as Madison pointed out clearly,
the protection was lost completely.
Arkes and McDonald both lament the effects of the Bill of Rights.  Arkes wrote that the
Bill of Rights caused Americans to forget the principles of liberty upon which the republic was
founded.168  He also noted, as Madison had in the debate, that a complete list of rights is not
possible, thus making a bill of rights an impractical way to protect liberty.169  McDonald goes a
bit further and argues that the bill has resulted in absurdities that he calls “freedom from
religion” where a school can not have any mention of God yet coins minted by the national
government itself bear His name.  Additionally, he argues that since the Bill of Rights is not
universally applied it has led to a decline in the rule of law.170  This has resulted in a situation
where, as Rushdooney notes, “we are less and less under the Constitution and increasingly under
the Supreme Court.”171
However, one might wonder that even if enumerated powers had not been rejected early
in American history, would they have proven to be more than parchment barriers themselves?
Enforcement of the barriers, like the Bill of Rights, would depend on the check of elections and
institutional checks.  Once again, a process of Judicial Review would probably have sprung up.
However, the key difference between enumerated powers and the Bill of Rights is contained in
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the specific nature of the enumerated powers.  When a right seems to be violated, as Arkes points
out, it is unclear whether such an instance is warranted (such as a suppression of profane or
dangerous speech) and leaves a great deal of room for interpretation.172  In contrast to this, when
the government exercises a power not specifically enumerated, the violation is clear and could
easily be reviewed by the Court or overturned by other institutional means (such as the president
refusing to enforce the unconstitutional act).  Thus, liberty would be protected by far more than
vague parchment barriers;  liberty would be protected by clear restrictions on the power the
government could exercise.
It is important to remember however, that liberty is not completely unsafe in America.
Both Henry and Madison did not see either enumerated powers or a bill of rights as the only
protection of liberty; these were the additional ingredients they saw as necessary.  Both men also,
as noted, looked to republican institutions to protect liberty.  It is these institutions and not the
bill of rights or the enumeration of powers (since it has been abandoned) that have preserved
liberty in the United States.  However, the majority in America is designed to rule over the long
term.  Thus, if these institutions are the only protections of liberty, then liberty truly does depend,
as Tocqueville said, upon the mild manners of the people, not anything in the government itself.
The answer to the complex questions surrounding rights and the role of the United States
government in protecting liberty resides in the understanding of the Constitution at the time of its
adoption.  To secure the liberty America was founded to maintain, the enumerated powers
doctrine needs to be reestablished.
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